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Abstrat
We study an exhange eonomy with overlapping generations of onsumers who
derive utility from onsuming a non-durable ommodity and housing. A banking
setor oers loans to nane housing. We provide a omplete haraterization of
the equilibrium dynamis whih alternates between an expansive regime where
housing pries inrease and banks expand loans and a ontrative regime assoi-
ated with dereasing housing values and shrinking redit volume. Regime swithes
our even under small but persistent inome hanges giving rise to large and re-
urrent booms and busts in housing pries not reeting hanges in fundamentals.
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1 Introdution
For more than a deade, from 1997 to 2007, U.S. residential values had ontinually in-
reased with housing pries in July 2007 being almost three times as high as in 1996. In
mid 2007, this inrease ame to an abrupt halt and housing pries dropped by almost
17% until June 2008 and by more than 30% between June 2007 and June 2009.
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In ret-
rospet, most researhers today seem to agree that houses were overvalued in 2006/2007
(f. Koherlakota (2011)), i.e., the inreases in housing values were not baked by fun-
damentals. A loser inspetion of the potential reasons also reveals that the build-up of
the housing bubble was aompanied by a ontinual inrease in mortgage loans and an
ever inreasing mortgage debt whih dropped sharply after the burst in 2007 (f. Chen
& Winter (2011) and He, Wright, & Zhu (2011)). This observation points to a potential
linkage between the lending ativities of banks and the evolution of housing pries.
While the US episode ertainly motivates a number of theoretial questions, the fo-
us of the present paper is on the o-movement between mortgage loans and housing
pries. We develop a theoretial model, whih explains large movements in housing
pries aompanied by orresponding hanges in redit volume. Our analysis unov-
ers a simple mehanism through whih small but persistent inome hanges generate
large movements in housing values and the aggregate redit volume. Remarkably, these
movements our in the absene of any sort of fritions. The mehanism generating
these boom-bust yles is a swith between two regimes eah assoiated with a ertain
inome level. In the rst regime, onsumers are eager to borrow and willing to pay a
high interest on loans suh that banks expand their redit volume over time and hous-
ing pries inrease without bound. In the seond regime, onsumers are only willing to
borrow at a lower interest for whih the redit volume shrinks over time and housing
pries derease to a lower bound. A swith between these two regimes ours under
quite moderate inome hanges. If the hange is persistent, the system tends to stay in
one regime for a number of periods generating large movements in housing pries and
the redit volume. During boom phases, onsumers buy houses at pries they ould
never have aorded and take loans they would be unable to repay from their inome
alone. Thus, the nanial side essentially deouples from the real side of the eonomy.
On the methodologial side, our paper belongs to the literature on the pure exhange
overlapping generations eonomy. The seminal work by Samuelson (1958) sets up the
foundation of the analysis of at money in the pure exhange overlapping generations
eonomy. Gale (1973) studies the dynami formulation of the Samuelson model and our
paper an best be seen as a straightforward extension of his work modied to inlude
inside money in the form of mortgage loans, and a durable good (housing) instead of
at money. Fiat money in Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973) is in xed supply and
thus its relative value is bounded by the fundamentals in the eonomy. By ontrast, the
1
These gures are taken from the Casey-Shiller housing index omposed over 10 areas.
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inside money in our model an fuel the housing prie indenitely.
In its eonomi theme, our paper is related to the theoretial literature on housing
market dynamis. As in our paper, Ortalo-Magne & Rady (2006) and Are & Lopez-
Salido (2011) study pure exhange overlapping generations models with a durable good
(housing). Ortalo-Magne & Rady (2006) studies a four period overlapping generations
model of the housing market with two types of homes, \starter" and \trade-up" homes,
and a down-payment onstraint on borrowing. They show that the volatility in the
inome of young households plays a ritial role for the \exess" volatility of housing
pries. Are & Lopez-Salido (2011) develops a three period overlapping generations
model, where bubbles solve the problem of insuÆient asset supply in the presene
of nanial frition. They analyze how loan supply shoks an eliminate bubbles and
push the eonomy into a low-valuation regime in whih the volume of debt and the
housing prie are lower in the presene of multiple steady states. They also show the
existene of multiple equilibria of pure and housing bubbles. Our model shares a ommon
feature with Ortalo-Magne & Rady (2006) and Are & Lopez-Salido (2011) that housing
generates utility and serves to ollateralize loans. However, borrowing is limited to a
fration of the value of the housing stok in their models while our model does not
assume any kind of nanial fritions.
He, Wright, & Zhu (2011) studies an innite-horizon eonomy where houses, in addition
to providing utility, also failitate transations in imperfet redit markets. They show
that even when fundamentals are onstant and agents are fully rational, house pries an
be pried above the present value of the marginal utility from living in the house. Their
housing dynamis is driven by beliefs, i.e. a self-fullling prophey in the eonomy with
multiple equilibria as well as by deterministi yles and haos. There are no multiple
equilibria in our model nor does it exhibit deterministi yles or haos. In this respet,
the mehanism in our model is loser to the one in Ortalo-Magne & Rady (2006) where
inome shoks of the young household drives the housing prie overreation.
This paper is also related to the reent literature that fouses on the role of housing and,
more generally, of durable onsumption goods for the maroeonomy (e.g. Bajari, Chan,
Krueger & Miller (2010) and Chen & Winter (2011)). Chen & Winter (2011) evaluates
the quantitative impat of the hange in housing naning on the onsumption boom.
Bajari, Chan, Krueger & Miller (2010) estimates a dynami strutural model of housing
demand and uses it to simulate how onsumer behavior responds to house prie and
inome delines as well as tightening redit onstraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 introdues the model. Setion 3 derives the
forward-reursive struture of equilibria while Setion 4 studies the equilibrium dynamis
under onstant inomes. Setion 5 generalizes the deterministi struture to the ase
with random inomes and analyzes the sope for boom-bust senarios to emerge due to
persistent inome hanges. We also show that a large omponent of housing pries is a
pure bubble dened as a deviation from the fundamental value. The theoretial ndings
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are illustrated and quantied in Setion 6 with the help of numerial simulations. Setion
7 onludes. Proofs for all results an be found in the mathematial appendix.
2 The Model
We onsider an exhange eonomy with disrete time periods t  0 and a durable and
a non-durable ommodity. We refer to the durable ommodity as `housing' and the
non-durable good as `the onsumption good'. The latter is hosen as the numeraire.
Consumption setor
The onsumption setor onsists of overlapping generations of homogeneous, two-period
lived onsumers. Eah member of the generation born in t  0 is endowed with e
y
t
> 0
units of the onsumption ommodity when young and e
o
t+1
> 0 units when old. The
following assumption speies the probabilisti nature of their inomes.
2
Assumption 1
The proess fe
t
g
t0
where e
t
:= (e
y
t
; e
o
t+1
) onsists of random variables dened on a
ommon probability spae (
;F ;P) with values in E := [e
y
min
; e
y
max
℄ [e
o
min
; e
o
max
℄  R
2
++
.
The proess is adapted to some ltration fF
t
g
t0
suh that e
t
: 
! E is F
t
{measurable.
A onsequene of Assumption 1 is that young onsumers observe their rst and seond
period inome when they make deisions. Thus, our analysis abstrats from inome
unertainty. Instead, we demonstrate below that preditable inome shifts suÆe to
generate large movements in housing pries.
Housing
Houses are retradable and in onstant supply normalized to unity. The young purhase
houses at the end of period t at the prie p
t
> 0, for whih they inur a xed ost  > 0
per unit to be paid in the following period t + 1. This parameter an be interpreted
as a ost assoiated with holding houses suh as maintenane and remodeling osts
or insurane payments. Housing investment provides a possibility to transfer wealth
intertemporally and yields utility in the following period.
Banking setor
The banking setor onsists of a large number of banks whih oer loans at a riskless
interest fator R
t
> 0. Let b
t
 0 denote the aggregate redit volume orresponding to
the resoure available to the banking setor at time t. This resoure is provided as loans
to the young and naned by the loan repayment of the old suh that
b
t
= R
t 1
b
t 1
; t  1: (1)
2
The notion of an adapted stohasti proess f
t
g
t0
implies that eah random variable 
t
is F
t
-
measurable and, therefore, an only depend on inomes e

observed during periods   t. As a
notational onvention, inequalities involving random variables are understood to hold in the P-almost
sure sense without expliit notie.
3
The initial value b
0
 0 is given historially.
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Struturally, the ontrats supplied by
banks an be interpreted as inside money (see Gale (1973) for an interpretation of
negative inside money).
Consumer demand
The young hoose (
y
; 
o
; h) to maximize their expeted lifetime utility based on some
von-Neumann Morgenstern utility funtion U , whih is additively separable over time,
i.e.,
U(
y
; 
o
; h) = u(
y
) + v(
o
; h): (2)
The funtion u is taken to be of the isoelasti form
u() =

1 
1  
;  > 0 (3)
with the usual interpretation that u() = log  if  = 1. Seond period utility v is
the omposition of u and an aggregator funtion g : R
2
++
! R
+
whih aggregates
durable and non-durable onsumption to a omposite ommodity g(
t
; h
t
). Following
Bajari, Chan, Krueger & Miller (2010) or Lustig & Nieuwerburgh (2005), we use a CES
aggregator
g(; h) = [

+ (1  )h

℄
1

; 0 <  < 1;  < 1:
The young disount seond-period utility by  > 0 and thus v takes the form
v(; h) =  u(g(; h)) = 
[

+ (1  )h

℄
1 

1  
: (4)
If  = 0, v is Cobb-Douglas while it is additively separable in housing and onsumption
if  = 1  .
Given p
t
> 0, R
t
> 0, and p
t+1
> 0, the budget onstraints are

y
= e
y
t
+ b  p
t
h and 
o
= e
o
t+1
  R
t
b + (p
t+1
  ) h: (5)
where b and h are the loan demand and housing investment respetively. Let E
t
[℄ :=
E [ j F
t
℄ denote the expetations operator onditional on the information available at
time t. Using (5), the young onsumers' objetive funtion at time t is
V
t
(b; h) := E
t
h
U(e
y
t
+ b  p
t
h; e
o
t+1
 R
t
b + (p
t+1
  ) h; h)
i
: (6)
Note that the housing prie p
t+1
is the only potential soure of unertainty. The on-
sumers' deision problem reads
max
b;h
n
V
t
(b; h) j p
t
h  e
y
t
+ b; e
o
t+1
  bR
t
+ h(p
t+1
  )  0; h  0
o
: (7)
3
An initial value b
0
< 0 would orrespond to the ase where banks take deposits. As our interest is
on banks granting mortgage loans we do not study this ase.
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Note that no sign restrition on b is imposed at the individual level.
Equilibrium.
The following denition of equilibrium reoniles market learing and individual opti-
mality under rational expetations.
Denition 1
Let inomes satisfy Assumption 1. Given an initial redit volume b
0
 0, an equilibrium
is an adapted stohasti proess fb
t
; h
t
; R
t
; p
t
g
t0
, whih satises p
t
> 0, R
t
> 0, and
the following onditions for eah t  0:
(i) The deision (b
t
; h
t
) solves (7) given pries and inomes.
(ii) Markets lear, i.e., h
t
= 1 and b
t
evolves aording to (1).
Note that Walras' law implies onsumption good market learing, i.e, 
y
t
+
o
t
= e
y
t
+e
o
t
 
for all t  0.
3 Reursive Equilibrium Struture
Preditable housing pries
To study the existene and dynami properties of equilibria, we onsider the ase where
housing pries are preditable, i.e., their realization an be predited one period in
advane. This assumption enables us to obtain an analytially tratable equilibrium. It
imposes no restritions in the ase when inomes are deterministi. Formally, we assume
that the housing prie p
t+1
is F
t
-measurable. Under this hypothesis, the young at time
t solve a deision problem under ertainty suh that the expetations operator in (6)
an be dropped.
Reursive equilibrium
As a rst step, we unveil the forward-reursive struture of equilibrium and the state
dynamis of the model. Essentially, we will show that the dynamis is driven by the
evolution of the variable
q
t
:= p
t
  b
t
; t  0; (8)
whih, we show, an be interpreted as the fundamental housing prie. We fous on
equilibria where q
t
> 0 for all t  0 suh that loans are fully baked by housing values.
This may be interpreted as a ollateral onstraint. Sine housing pries are preditable
and banks oer riskless interest rates, the proess fq
t
g
t0
is preditable as well.
Sine no sign-restrition is imposed on b at the individual level, the rst order ondi-
tions of the young onsumers' deision problem (7) must be satised in equilibrium.
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Exploiting this, (2), and (8), the following Euler equations have to hold for eah period
t  0:
u
0
(e
y
t
  q
t
) = R
t
v

(e
o
t+1
   + q
t+1
; 1) (9a)
p
t
u
0
(e
y
t
  q
t
) = (p
t+1
  ) v

(e
o
t+1
  + q
t+1
; 1) + v
h
(e
o
t+1
  + q
t+1
; 1): (9b)
From (9a) and (9b) we infer that the interest fator R
t
must be higher than the return
from housing (p
t+1
  )=p
t
. This is beause the old derive utility from housing. Given
e = (e
y
; e
o
) 2 E , let F (; ; e) : (  e
0
;1)  ( 1; e
y
)! R where
F (q
1
; q; e) := q u
0
(e
y
  q)  v

(e
o
   + q
1
; 1) (q
1
  )  v
h
(e
o
  + q
1
; 1): (10)
Then, adding (9a) and (9b) using (1) and (8) gives the following equilibrium ondition
F (q
t+1
; q
t
; e
t
) = 0 (11)
whih has to hold at eah time t  0. Condition (11) determines the value q
t+1
impliitly
as a funtion of q
t
and e
t
. The following result states neessary and suÆient onditions
under whih a unique solution to (11) an be determined.
Lemma 1
Suppose   0 and  < 1. Then, for eah e = (e
y
; e
o
) 2 E and q < e
y
there exists a
unique value q
1
>   e
o
, whih satises F (q
1
; q; e) = 0.
Lemma 1 permits to dene a map f(; e) : ( 1; e
y
) ! (   e
o
;1) whih determines
the unique zero of F (; q; e) = 0 for eah q < e
y
.
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Thus, whenever q
t
< e
y
t
, the solution
to (11) an be written as
q
t+1
= f(q
t
; e
t
): (12)
The next result establishes properties of f .
Lemma 2
Suppose   0 and  < 1. Then, for eah e = (e
y
; e
0
) 2 E the map f = f(; e) is
ontinuously dierentiable with derivative f
0
(q) > 0 for all q < e
y
.
Using the result from (12) in (9a) and (9b), the equilibrium interest fator and next
period's (expeted) housing prie are determined from e
t
2 E , q
t
< e
y
t
and p
t
by
R
t
= R(q
t
; e
t
) :=
u
0
(e
y
t
  q
t
)
v

(e
o
t+1
  + f(q
t
; e
y
t
); 1)
(13)
p
t+1
= P(p
t
; q
t
; e
t
) := R(q
t
; e
t
)p
t
+  
v
h
(e
o
t+1
  + f(q
t
; e
t
); 1)
v

(e
o
t+1
   + f(q
t
; e
t
); 1)
(14)
4
The restritions   0 and  < 1 are neessary and suÆient for lim
!1
v

(; 1)  = 1 whih is
ruial for existene of a solution to (11) for arbitrary q
t
and e
t
. Although the restrition  < 1 exludes
a logarithmi funtion u used in Bajari, Chan, Krueger & Miller (2010), this ase an be approximated
as the limiting ase ! 1 in our setup.
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while loans b
t+1
follow from (1). Equation (13) equates the equilibrium interest fator
to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in onsumption. One also infers from
(14) that the equilibrium housing return (p
t+1
 )=p
t
must be smaller than R
t
due to the
positive marginal rate of substitution between housing and seond period onsumption.
Also, note that q
t
> 0 ensures that p
t
> 0 by (8).
4 Housing Prie Dynamis
Dynamis under onstant inomes
Based on the previous results, we are now ready to study the dynamis of the model
and establish onditions for the existene of equilibrium. To this end, note that (12)
does not yet dene a dynamial system beause we have not determined a suitable state
spae Q on whih the dynamis an live. While this setion studies the equilibrium
dynamis under onstant rst-period inome, the next setion will extend this to the
ase where rst-period inome is random. Let us rst x e
t
 e = (e
y
; e
o
) 2 E for all
t  0. For notational onveniene, the dependene of variables and funtions on e will
be suppressed. We seek to determine an interval Q  [0; e
y
) whih is self-supporting
for the map f = f(; e), i.e., f(q) 2 Q for all q 2 Q . By the properties of f established
in Lemma 2, xed points, i.e., values q whih satisfy q = f(q), are natural boundary
points of intervals whih are self-supporting under f . Thus, we begin by studying xed
points of f and their properties. Sine f maps ( 1; e
y
) into (  e
o
;1), it is lear that
any suh xed point must lie in the open interval (   e
o
; e
y
). Therefore, a neessary
preondition for xed points to exist is e
y
+ e
o
> . This ondition simply says that the
resoures available in eah period are large enough to over housing osts. Below, we
even require a stronger ondition that e
o
> . It follows from (10) that xed-points of
f obtain as zeros of the map G : (  e
o
; e
y
)! R where
G(q) := F (q; q; e) (15)
= q u
0
(e
y
  q)  v

(e
o
  + q; 1) (q   )  v
h
(e
o
   + q; 1):
The following result states properties of the map G.
Lemma 3
Suppose   0 and  < 1. Then, for eah e = (e
y
; e
0
) 2 E satisfying e
y
+ e
o
>  the
map G = G(; e) is a stritly onvex funtion and the derivative satises the boundary
behavior lim
q!e
y
G
0
(q) =   lim
q! e
o
G
0
(q) =1.
A onsequene of the lemma is the existene of a unique value q
min
2 (   e
o
; e
y
) at
whih G
0
(q
min
) = 0 and G attains its global minimum. Based on this insight, the next
result states onditions for xed points to exist and haraterizes their properties.
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Lemma 4
Suppose   0 and  < 1. Let inomes e = (e
y
; e
0
) 2 E be given and assume that
e
y
+ e
o
>  and G(q
min
) < 0. Then,
(i) The map f has preisely two xed points q 2 (  e
o
; q
min
) and

q 2 (q
min
; e
y
).
(ii) The xed point

q is loally unstable while q is asymptotially stable. Moreover,
f(q) > q for all q 2 ( 1; q ) [ (

q; e
y
) and f(q) < q for all q 2 (q;

q).
Setting aside the non-generi ase where G(q
min
) = 0, the boundary behavior of G
implies that the ondition G(q
min
) < 0 is not only suÆient but also neessary for xed
points to exist. Moreover, it an be shown that G(q
min
) > 0 would imply f(q; e) > q
for all q. In this ase, for any q
0
< e
y
a repeated iteration of the forward-reursion (12)
would produe a value q
t
> e
y
after nitely many periods t  1. Thus, G(q
min
) < 0 is
also a neessary ondition for the dynamis to be viable. The nding from Lemma 4 is
illustrated in the following gures whih depit the map f and the xed point map G.
Note that the zeros of G in Figure 1(b) orrespond to intersetions of (the graph of) f
with the prinipal diagonal in Figure 1(a).
-0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
PSfrag replaements
f(q)
G(q)
q
(a) The map f
-0.05 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
PSfrag replaements
f(q)
G(q)
q
(b) Fixed point map G
Figure 1: Time-one map of state dynamis
Lemma 4(ii) reveals that the set ( 1;

q℄ is self-supporting under f . Thus, the map f
restrited to this set beomes the time-one map of a one-dimensional dynamial system
in disrete time.
5
Moreover, for any initial value q
0
2 ( 1;

q) the sequene fq
t
g
t0
dened reursively as q
t+1
= f(q
t
), t  0 onverges monotonially to q. By ontrast, for
any initial value q
0
2 (

q; e
y
) the forward-reursion q
t+1
= f(q
t
) exeeds e
y
after nitely
many periods. Thus, the forward dynamis is well-dened if and only if q
0
2 ( 1;

q℄.
In the sequel, we will exlude

q from the state spae in order to rule out degenerate
equilibria.
6
To ensure q
t
 0, we assume that the smaller xed point satises q > 0.
Then, Lemma 4(ii) in onjuntion with Lemma 2 imply that the interval Q := [0;

q) is
5
For onveniene, we denote the restrition of f to a subset Q  ( 1; e
y
) by f as well.
6
In the stohasti ase to be studied in the next setion, this imposes no additional restrition
regarding the long run behavior of the system.
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self-supporting under f as well. Thus, restriting f to Q denes a disrete dynamial
system whih governs the evolution of the variable q
t
2 Q over time. The long-run
behavior is now haraterized in the following result, whih requires in addition e
o
> .
Lemma 5
Suppose   0 and  < 1. Let inomes e = (e
y
; e
0
) 2 E be given and assume that e
o
> 
and G(q
min
) < 0 < q. Then,
(i) The restrited map f : Q ! Q has q as its unique xed point.
(ii) This xed point is globally stable and for eah q
0
2 Q the sequene fq
t
g
t0
dened
reursively as q
t+1
= f(q
t
; e
y
), t  0 onverges monotonially to q.
In addition to the parameter restritions   0 and  < 1, the previous ndings show
that the main restritions needed for the dynamis to be well-dened are that G(q
min
) <
0 and, in addition, q > 0. The latter is neessary and suÆient for the dynamis to live
in a subset of R
++
and satised if and only if G
0
(0) < 0 < G(0). Using (4) in (15),
diret omputations give
G(0) > 0 ,  >
v
h
(e
o
  ; 1)
v

(e
o
  ; 1)
=
1  

[e
o
  ℄
1 
(16a)
G
0
(0) < 0 , u
0
(e
y
) < (1  )v

(e
o
  ; 1)  e
o
v

(e
o
  ; 1): (16b)
Condition (16a) shows that G(0) > 0 is violated for  = 0 and, therefore, requires
housing osts to exeed a ritial level whih depends on e
o
.
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As this ondition is
independent of rst-period inome, the value e
y
an always be hosen suÆiently large
to satisfy the seond ondition (16b). Notie, however, that the ondition G(q
min
) < 0
depends on these hoies as well. Given that q
min
is only impliitly dened by G
0
(q) =
0, it is diÆult to fully haraterize the underlying parameter sets. The numerial
simulation of the following setion, however, shows that all three onditions are satised
for a broad range of eonomially reasonable parameterizations.
Equilibrium under onstant inomes
We are now in a position to haraterize the omplete equilibrium dynamis for a xed
inome proess e
t
 e = (e
y
; e
o
) 2 E for whih all hypotheses of Lemma 5 are satised.
Fix an initial value (p
0
; b
0
) whih satises b
0
 0, p
0
> 0, and q
0
= p
0
  b
0
2 Q . Then,
ombining our previous results with (1), (8), (13), and (14) one obtains the following
7
As argued above, the housing return must be lower than the interest fator at equilibrium. If  = 0,
then p
t+1
=p
t
< b
t+1
=b
t
= R
t
. This implies that the loan volume grows faster than the housing prie
and thus, within nite time the old will not be able to repay their debt. A similar onlusion holds in
a modied version of our model where housing is replaed by a Luas' tree traded at prie p
t
, whih
yields a positive dividend in eah period. The senario with zero dividend payments orresponds to the
ase with at money where the eonomy onverges to an autarky steady state.
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system whih governs the evolution of all equilibrium variables:
q
t+1
= f(q
t
; e) (17a)
b
t+1
= R(q
t
; e)b
t
(17b)
p
t+1
= f(q
t
; e) +R(q
t
; e)b
t
: (17)
The dynamis (17a) of q
t
is deoupled from the other two variables and onverge mono-
tonially to a unique steady state q by Lemma 5. Moreover, this proess denes the
indued onsumption alloation as

y
t
= e
y
t
  q
t
(18a)

o
t
= e
0
t
  + q
t
: (18b)
It is evident from (17b) and (17) that the qualitative long-run dynami behavior of
the redit volume b
t
and housing pries p
t
depend on the steady state interest fator
R(q; e). If R(q; e) < 1, the redit volume asymptotially onverges to zero while by (8)
pries onverge to p = q. Conversely, if R(q; e) > 1 and b
0
> 0, both the redit volume
and housing pries grow without bound and onverge to innity. Notie, however, that
the equilibrium dynamis is well-dened in either ase. The following nal theorem of
this setion summarizes these insights and establishes the existene and properties of
equilibrium.
Theorem 1
Suppose   0 and  < 1. Let inomes e = (e
y
; e
0
) 2 E be given and assume that e
o
> 
and G(q
min
) < 0 < q. Then,
(i) Eah p
0
> 0 and b
0
 0 for whih p
0
  b
0
2 Q denes an equilibrium where the
evolution of the equilibrium variables follows (17a{) and lim
t!1
q
t
= q.
(ii) If b
0
> 0 and R(q; e) > 1, then lim
t!1
p
t
= lim
t!1
b
t
=1.
(iii) If b
0
= 0 or R(q; e) < 1, then lim
t!1
p
t
= q while lim
t!1
b
t
= 0.
5 Housing Booms and Busts
Dynamis under random inomes
We now analyze the ase where inomes utuate randomly over time. For ease of
exposition, we will onne attention to the ase where only rst-period inomes hange
over time while seond-period inomes are assumed to be onstant. Thus, assume as
in the previous setion that e
o
t
 e
o
>  while e
y
t
utuates over time taking values in
the set E
y
:= [e
y
min
; e
y
max
℄  R
++
. In the sequel, we will therefore drop the argument
e
o
writing e.g. f(q; e
y
) instead of f(q; e
y
; e
o
). Consider rst how the proess fq
t
g
t0
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dened in (8) evolves over time. It is lear from (12) that this proess is well-dened if
and only if q
t
< e
y
t
for all t  0 P{a.s., i.e., q
t
< e
y
min
for all t  0 P{a.s. Suppose this
an be satised. Then, the forward-reursive struture of the model is well-dened and
generated by randomly mixing the family of mappings (f ; e
y
)
e
y
2E
y
. That is, given q
t
,
the value e
y
t
2 E realized at time t 'selets' a partiular map f(; e
y
t
) whih determines
the next value q
t+1
= f(q
t
; e
y
t
). For this forward-reursion to be well-dened, we seek
to determine a stable interval Q  [0; e
y
min
) whih is self supporting under the family
(f ; e
y
)
e
y
2E
y
, i.e., q 2 Q implies f(q; e
y
) 2 Q for all e
y
2 E
y
.
While the underlying onstrution priniple is the same as in the previous setion, the
present ase must inorporate that the map f and its xed points vary with the inome
proess. Let us assume that the hypotheses of Lemma 5 are satised for all e
y
2 E
y
.
Then, eah map f(; e
y
) has preisely two xed points in (0; e
y
) whih we denote by
q(e
y
) and

q(e
y
), respetively. The next result desribes how these xed points vary with
inome.
Lemma 6
Let the hypotheses of Lemma 5 be satised for eah e
y
2 E
y
. Then,
(i) For eah q > 0 the map e
y
7! f(q; e
y
) is ontinuously dierentiable (on the interior
of E
y
) and stritly dereasing.
(ii) The xed point maps e
y
7! q(e
y
) and e
y
7!

q(e
y
) are both ontinuously dieren-
tiable. Moreover, q() is stritly dereasing while

q() is stritly inreasing.
Using the previous result, dene
q
min
:= min
e
y
2E
y
n
q(e
y
)
o
= q(e
y
max
) (19a)
q
max
:= max
e
y
2E
y
n
q(e
y
)
o
= q(e
y
min
) (19b)

q
min
:= min
e
y
2E
y
n

q(e
y
)
o
=

q(e
y
min
): (19)
Note that the values dened in (19a{) satisfy 0 < q
min
< q
max
<

q
min
. Thus, dening

Q := [q
min
; q
max
℄ and Q := [0;

q
min
) we have the inlusions ; 6=

Q $ Q . The following
result essentially extends Lemma 5 to the more general stohasti ase.
Lemma 7
Let the hypotheses of Lemma 5 be satised for eah e
y
2 E
y
. Then,
(i) Both intervals

Q and Q are self-supporting for the family (f  : e
y
)
e
y
2E
y
.
(ii) For eah q
0
2 Q , the dynamis generated by randomly mixing (f ; e
y
)
e
y
2E
y
onverge
to the set

Q P{a.s..
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It follows from Lemma 7 that asymptotially, the proess fq
t
g
t0
will take values in the
set

Q . Thus, if fe
y
t
g
t0
is suÆiently regular, e.g., follows a Markov proess, standard
results from the literature (f. Brok & Mirman (1972) and Wang (1993)) imply the
existene of a unique invariant distribution supported on

Q whih governs the long-
run probabilisti behavior of the proess fq
t
g
t0
. In partiular, this proess will be
asymptotially stationary.
8
Figure 2 illustrates the nding from Lemma 7 for the ase
with two shoks where e
y
t
2 fe
y
min
; e
y
max
g for all t.
f(·; ey
min
) f(·; ey
max
)f(·; ey)
q¯min q¯max qq¯min
Figure 2: Time-one maps generating the dynamis under two shoks
Equilibrium under random inomes
Based on the previous result, the following theorem generalizes the existene result from
Theorem 1(i) to the ase with stohasti rst-period inomes. Note that Theorem 1(i)
obtains as a speial ase where e
y
min
= e
y
max
= e
y
.
Theorem 2
Let the hypotheses of Lemma 5 be satised for eah e
y
2 E
y
. Then, eah p
0
> 0 and
b
0
 0 for whih q
0
:= p
0
  b
0
2 Q denes an equilibrium proess generated by (12),
(13), and (14).
Sine we are interested in the long-run properties of equilibrium, we an onne attention
to the set

Q by virtue of Lemma 7(ii). Analogously to the previous setion, the sign of
the interest rate is ruial for the long-run behavior of equilibrium housing pries and
the redit volume. The following result haraterizes how the interest fator hanges
along with the shoks and the value of q.
8
Lemma 4(ii) and the denitions (19a{) imply that the family f = (f  : e
y
)
e
y
2E
restrited to the
interval Q possesses a stable xed-point onguration in the sense of Brok & Mirman (1972). Thus,
the assertion follows from their results, see also Wang (1993).
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Lemma 8
Let the hypotheses of Lemma 5 be satised for eah e
y
2 E
y
. Then, the map R dened
in (13) is ontinuously dierentiable with partial derivatives R
e
y
(q; e
y
) < 0 < R
q
(q; e
y
)
for all e
y
> 0 and q < e
y
.
Let
R
min
:= minfR(q; e
y
) j q 2

Q ; e
y
2 Eg = R(q
min
; e
y
max
) (20a)
R
max
:= maxfR(q; e
y
) j q 2

Q ; e
y
2 Eg = R(q
max
; e
y
min
): (20b)
We now have the following result whih extends the haraterization of equilibrium from
Theorem 1(ii) and (iii) to the general stohasti ase.
Theorem 3
Let the hypotheses of Lemma 5 be satised for eah e
y
2 E
y
. Then,
(i) If b
0
> 0 and R
min
> 1, then lim
t!1
p
t
= lim
t!1
b
t
=1, P{a.s.
(ii) If b
0
= 0 or R
max
< 1, then lim
t!1
b
t
= 0 P{a.s. while lim
t!1
jp
t
  q
t
j = 0 P{a.s.
Theorem 3 shows that the long-run behavior of housing pries and the redit volume is
either expansive (i) or stationary (ii). We observe that if b
0
= 0, i.e., in the absene of a
banking setor, the housing prie oinides with the proess fq
t
g
t0
whih is stationary
and well-behaved. Thus, any potential non-stationarity in housing pries is exlusively
due to the banking setor. Exluding the non-generi ases of either R
min
= 1 or
R
max
= 1, reurrent housing booms and busts an emerge only if R
min
< 1 < R
max
.
The mehanism for booms and busts
To illustrate a mehanism that generates booms and busts of housing pries, onsider
the simplest ase where e
y
takes two values e
y
min
and e
y
max
with positive probability. Let
b
0
> 0 and R
min
< 1 < R
max
. Suppose that inomes initially take the lower value
e
y
t
= e
y
min
. Then, the dynamis generated by the map f(; e
y
min
) start onverging to
the assoiated steady state q(e
y
min
) = q
max
and we have R
t
> 1 for t suÆiently large
as R(q
max
; e
y
min
) = R
max
> 1. By (1), the redit volume starts to expand and so do
housing pries while their dierene q
t
is stationary. Intuitively, the low rst period
inome inreases the need for onsumption smoothing and the demand for redit, for
whih the young are willing to pay a high interest rate. Although the supply of redit
expands over time as well, this is absorbed by a orresponding higher demand due to
inreasing housing pries. Thus, we see that as long as the low inome regime prevails,
both housing prie and redit volume inrease whereas their dierene onverges to q
max
.
Now, suppose that at some time
~
t > 0, inomes swith to the higher value e
y
max
. The
orresponding dynamis is now generated by the map f(; e
y
max
) whih has q
min
as its
unique steady state to whih the variable q
t
starts onverging. For suÆiently large
13
t >
~
t, we will have R
t
< 1 implying that both the redit volume and housing prie
will ontrat. Although this indues a {perfetly foreseen{ apital loss, the demand for
housing is still positive as it yields utility.
Combining these observations, it is lear that under a random inome proess, the sys-
tem will alternate between an expansionary regime and a ontrative regime. These
hanges are most profound if R(q; e
y
min
) > 1 and R(q; e
y
max
) < 1 for all q 2

Q . The
rst requirement is equivalent to R(q
min
; e
y
min
) > 1 and implies that the redit volume
starts expanding immediately when e
t
= e
y
min
. The seond ondition is equivalent to
R(q
max
; e
y
max
) < 1 and implies that the redit volume starts ontrating immediately
when e
t
= e
y
min
. Now if the inome proess is persistent, then long periods of redit ex-
pansion will follow long periods of redit ontration. This mehanism oers a potential
to generate large movements in housing pries simply due to persistent inome hanges.
The previous mehanism straightforwardly generalizes to the ase where inomes are
ontinuously distributed on the interval [e
y
min
; e
y
max
℄ as long as the dynamis alternates
between the expansive regime f(q; e) 2

Q E
y
j R(q; e) > 1g and the ontrative regime
f(q; e) 2

Q  E
y
j R(q; e) < 1g.
Bubbles and fundamental housing pries
It is worthwhile to relate our previous results to the emergene of a bubble whih is
widely disussed in the literature. In these models the notion of bubbles orresponds
to an intrinsially valueless asset that is traded at a positive prie. In our model, the
redit volume supplied by the banking setor is not baked by any resoures and satises
this denition. Consequently, the bubble-less equilibrium in our eonomy orresponds
to the initial hoie b
0
= 0 whih implies b
t
 0 and p
t
= q
t
for all t. Therefore, we shall
all q
t
the fundamental housing prie. We know from our previous results that for any
q
0
> 0, the fundamental housing prie proess fq
t
g
t0
is well-behaved and onverges to
a unique stable interval [q
min
; q
max
℄  (0; e
y
min
) whih shrinks to a point q if inomes are
deterministi.
Under this interpretation, it follows diretly from (8) that for an arbitrary b
0
 0, the
equilibrium housing prie p
t
may be written as the sum of its fundamental value q
t
and
the bubbly omponent b
t
. Given a xed initial fundamental prie q
0
, any injetion of
redit b
0
> 0 therefore merely inreases the bubbly omponent of the housing prie.
With the initial fundamental prie q
0
unhanged, one also observes from (17a) and
(18a,b) that the resulting onsumption alloation is not aeted by the presene of a
bubble. Thus, any injetion of redit is fully neutral with respet to onsumer welfare.
Housing investment is in part naned by rst period inome and selling revenue exeeds
the loan repayment. Thus, at equilibrium there is an eetive transfer of resoures from
the young to old. If inomes alternate between the expansive and ontrative state, large
movements in housing pries our whih an almost exlusively be attributed to the
bubbly omponent with the fundamental prie being bounded by the inome proess.
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6 A Quantitative Example
We employ numerial simulations to show that the boom-bust senario studied previ-
ously ours under reasonable parameter hoies and the swith between the two regimes
is triggered by relatively small inome hanges.
Parameters
Bajari, Chan, Krueger & Miller (2010) use a logarithmi funtion u whih we approx-
imate in our setup by hoosing  lose to unity. They also devise an elastiity of
substitution between housing and seond-period onsumption slightly larger than unity
(about 1:3) orresponding to  = 0:24. For simpliity, we follow Li & Yao (2007) by
onning ourselves to the ase of unit elastiity setting  = 0 whih yields a Cobb-
Douglas funtion for seond-period utility. For this hoie, the parameter 1   an be
interpreted as the share of housing expenditure in onsumer inome and Bajari, Chan,
Krueger & Miller (2010) hoose a value of   :77. Given that housing is onned to
the seond period of life in our setup, we hoose a smaller value  = :67. As in Hurd
(1989), onsumers' annual time disount is taken to be 1/1.011 implying a disount
fator  = 0:70  (1=1:011)
35
. We normalize inomes by setting e
o
= 1 and assume that
rst period inomes fe
y
t
g
t0
follows a symmetri two-state Markov proess with values
in E
y
= fe
y
min
= 1:425; e
y
max
= 1:5g and a time-invariant transition probability  = 0:2.
Thus the proess is highly persistent with an 80% hane of retaining its urrent state
and a 20% hane of swithing to the opposite state. The fat that inomes are higher in
the rst than in the seond period seems broadly onsistent with empirial evidene, f.
Table 3 in Bajari, Chan, Krueger & Miller (2010).
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Finally, our hoie for  = 1=3 im-
plies that housing osts make up slightly more than 10% of onsumers' lifetime inome.
The initial values are set to p
0
= b
0
= 1. Under this parametrization, the hypotheses
of Lemma 4 hold for all e
y
2 E
y
. Thus, for eah xed inome stream e
y
t
 e
y
2 E
y
, the
dynamis (17a) onverges to a unique steady state q(e
y
) > 0.
10
In partiular, the above
parametrization implies that R
min
= R(q(e
y
max
); e
y
max
) < 1 < R(q(e
y
min
); e
y
min
) = R
max
suh that the neessary onditions for booms and busts of housing pries to our are
satised.
Simulation results
We simulate the model for T = 6000 periods and display the time series in Figure 3
starting in t = 3000 to apture the long run harateristis of the model. The left
panel shows a time window of the housing prie p
t
and the redit volume b
t
. To relate
movements in these variables to the `fundamentals' of the eonomy we also depit the
9
This is also onsistent if we were to replae the pure exhange setting by a prodution eonomy
where the young earn labor inome and the old apital inome. Empirial evidene then suggests that
the former is about twie as large as the latter.
10
We remark that the hosen parametrization guarantees positivity of steady states, whih may fail
to exist at all or q(e
y
) < 0 for some e
y
2 E
y
under other parametrization.
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aggregate net inome e
y
t
+ e
o
   whih represents the total resoures available in pe-
riod t net of housing osts. The right panel depits the leverage ratio b
t
=(e
y
t
+ e
o
R
 1
t
)
whih measures the perentage share of loans baked by onsumers' disounted lifetime
inomes.
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Figure 3: A boom-bust senario
The gures onrm that the mehanism identied in the previous setions generates
large and persistent movements in the housing prie and the redit volume. These
two variables are intimately interonneted and are almost impossible to distinguish in
Figure 3(a). By our previous results, we know that p
t
 b
t
follows a stationary stohasti
proess. We also see that for most time periods both the housing investment and the
redit volume exeed the aggregate inome by an order of magnitude.
To provide a quantitative illustration of these phenomena, onsider the situation in
period t
0
= 4662 where the bubble reahes a temporary peak. In this period, the young
are in the low-inome state reeiving e
y
t
0
= 1:425 suh that aggregate net inome is
e
y
t
0
+ e
o
   = 2:09. The redit volume supplied by banks is b
t
0
= 17:23 and the interest
on loans is 2:7%, i.e., R
t
0
= 1:027. The young buy houses at the prie p
t
0
= 17:24 whih
is naned by taking a loan equal to b
t
0
. This orresponds to a leverage ratio of 710%.
Moreover, the loan repayment R
t
0
b
t
0
is about eighteen time as large as seond-period
non-housing inome e
o
. However, the next period's housing prie p
t
0
+1
= 17:71 allows
onsumers to repay their loan from the revenues of selling their houses at the end of
period t
0
+ 1. This onrms our earlier insight that a redit volume exeeding real
inomes by an order of magnitude an still be sustained by a orresponding inrease in
housing values. In fat, the net ow from the young to old onsumers, whih is equal to
the fundamental prie of housing, is only q
t
0
= p
t
0
  b
t
0
= 0:01.
We remark that the same qualitative results were observed when rst period inome
has an absolutely-ontinuous and state dependent probability distribution, whih alter-
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nates between a high inome distribution and a low inome distribution with the same
transition probability as before. Hene, the simplifying assumption of inome following
a two-state proess is not essential for our numerial results.
7 Conlusions
In the absene of a banking setor the only intergenerational transfer of ommodities in
our model is from the young to old through the housing market. Consequently, housing
values are bounded by young onsumers' inomes. Introduing a banking setor adds
an additional hannel of intergenerational trade in the form of a redit market, whih
mediates a ommodity transfer from the old to young. The ombination of these hannels
permits eah ow of intergenerational transfers to beome arbitrarily large as long as the
net ow remains bounded by onsumers' inomes. This struture amplies small but
persistent inome hanges into large movements of housing pries and redit volumes,
whih are both non-stationary while a linear ombination of them follows a stationary
stohasti proess. The presene of suh a ointegration relationship is therefore an
impliation of the model that is testable empirially.
In our model, the boom in housing pries aompanied by expanding loan volumes o-
urs when the interest fator exeeds unity. Hene, the stationary endowment proess
implies that the interest rate is greater than the growth rate of the eonomy when bub-
bles emerge, a feature of the model shared by Are & Lopez-Salido (2011), Caballero,
Farhi, & Hammour (2006), Martin & Ventura (2012), and Ventura (2012). The boom
omes to a halt when a higher inome of the young auses the interest fator to drop
below unity. This omovement between the interest rate and the redit volume ours
naturally in a model with inside money but may be at odds with the empirial observa-
tion that the ost of renaning is relatively low in many bubble episodes. An interesting
question that we leave for future researh is whether this relationship reverses when the
model inludes outside money. Suh an extension would also permit to investigate how
monetary poliies interat with the banking setor and the housing market.
Another feature of our exhange eonomy is that bubbles do not aet produtive invest-
ment and hene onsumer inomes. Whether bubbles in our framework remain welfare
neutral in the presene of apital aumulation is also an interesting question to be
explored.
17
A Mathematial Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let e = (e
y
; e
o
) 2 E and q < e
y
be arbitrary but xed. For brevity, set q :=   e
o
and
H(q
1
) := v

(q
1
  q; 1) (q
1
  ) + v
h
(q
1
  q; 1); q
1
> q: (A.1)
Sine v in (4) is homogeneous of degree 1 , Euler's theorem for homogeneous funtions
implies v

(; 1) + v
h
(; 1) = (1  )v(; 1) for all  > 0 permitting us to write
H(q
1
) = (1  ) v(q
1
  q; 1)  v

(q
1
  q; 1) e
o
; q
1
> q: (A.2)
Sine   0, the funtion v satises the Inada ondition lim
!0
v

(; 1) =1. Thus,
lim
q
1
!q
H(q
1
) = (1  ) v(0; 1)  e
o
lim
q
1
!q
v

(q
1
  q; 1) =  1: (A.3)
Furthermore, the restritions   0 and  < 1 together imply lim
!1
 v

(; 1) = 1.
Using this in (A.1) yields the right limit as
lim
q
1
!1
H(q
1
)  lim
q
1
!1
v

(q
1
  q; 1) (q
1
  ) =1: (A.4)
Existene of the desired solution thus follows from (A.3), (A.4), and ontinuity of H.
Uniqueness is a onsequene of (A.2) and the onavity of v whih give the derivative
H
0
(q
1
) = (1  )v

(q
1
  q; 1)  v

(q
1
  q; 1) e
o
> 0: (A.5)

A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Sine F
q
1
(q
1
; q; e) =  H
0
(q
1
) < 0 by (10) and (A.5) and F is ontinuously dierentiable,
so is the impliit funtion f by the Impliit Funtion Theorem. The partial derivative
of (10) with respet to q omputes
F
q
(q
1
; q; e) = u
0
(e
y
  q)  qu
00
(e
y
  q) = (e
y
  q)
 
e
y
  (1  )q
e
y
  q
> 0: (A.6)
By the impliit funtion theorem f
0
(q) =  
F
q
(q
1
;q;e)
F
q
1
(q
1
;q;e)
> 0 where q
1
= f(q; e). 
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
By (15), the funtion G an be written as G(q) = D(q) H(q) with H being dened as
in (A.2) and D(q) := qu
0
(e
y
  q) = q(e
y
  q)
 
; q < e
y
.
Consider rst the behavior of the funtion D whose derivatives satisfy
D
0
(q) =
e
y
  (1  )q
(e
y
  q)
1+
> (1  )
e
y
  q
(e
y
  q)
1+
=
1  
(e
y
  q)

> 0 (A.7)
D
00
(q) =

(e
y
  q)
2+

2e
y
  (1  )q

>
(1  )
(e
y
  q)
2+

e
y
  q

> 0: (A.8)
The seond inequality shows that D is a stritly onvex funtion while the rst one
implies that D is stritly inreasing with boundary behavior lim
q!e
y
D
0
(q) =1.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, the derivative of H is given by (A.5) and, therefore,
satises H
0
(q) > 0 and lim
q! e
o
H
0
(q)  (1   ) lim
q! e
o
v

(e
o
   + q; 1) = 1. We
laim that H
0
is a stritly dereasing funtion implying that  H is stritly onvex. The
rst term in (A.5) is stritly dereasing by strit onavity of v. It therefore suÆes to
show that  7!  v

(; 1) is dereasing as well. Dening g as in (2), diret alulations
reveal that the seond derivative of v an be written as
 v

(; 1) =
v

(; 1)


1    (1    )


g(; 1)


= v

(; 1)



1 

g(; 1)

+
1  


(1  )
g(; 1)


: (A.9)
Realling that 1     0, all three terms in (A.9) are positive and stritly dereasing
funtions of  whih implies that  7!  v

(; 1) is dereasing as laimed.
Thus,  H is a stritly onvex funtion as laimed and G being the sum of two (stritly)
onvex funtions is also stritly onvex. The boundary behavior of G
0
follows diretly
from the limits omputed above and the monotoniity properties of D and  H. 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
(i) Using (15) in onjuntion with (A.2), a routine alulation shows that lim
q!e
y
G(q) =
lim
q! e
o
G(q) =1. Thus, G(q
min
) < 0 implies that G has a xed point in eah of the
intervals (  e
o
; q
min
) and (q
min
; e
y
). By strit onvexity and the boundary behavior of
the rst derivative (f. Lemma 3), the map G is stritly dereasing on (  e
o
; q
min
) and
stritly inreasing on (q
min
; e
y
). Thus, there an be at most one xed point in eah of
the two intervals.
(ii) It is obvious from (i) that G
0
(q) < 0 < G
0
(

q). Utilizing the result from Lemma
2 and the denitions of D and H given in the proof of Lemma 4, this implies that
G
0
(q) = D
0
(q) H
0
(q) < 0 and G
0
(

q) = D
0
(

q) H
0
(

q) > 0. Therefore,
0 < f
0
(q) =
D
0
(q)
H
0
(q)
< 1 <
D
0
(

q)
H
0
(

q)
= f
0
(

q) (A.10)
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whih implies the loal stability properties asserted. The remaining inequalities follow
from this and the uniqueness of the xed points on the respetive intervals. 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Assertion (i) follows immediately from Lemma 4(i). The result in (ii) is a onsequene
of loal stability of q and Lemma 4(ii). Monotoniity of the sequene fq
t
g
t0
follows
from this and Lemma 2. 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 1
(i) Lemma 5 and q
0
2 Q imply that q
t
2 Q for all t and lim
t!1
q
t
= q. By (1) and (13),
b
0
> 0 implies b
t
> 0 and, by (8) p
t
> 0 for all t proving (i).
(ii) If R(q; e) > 1, then there exists t
0
 0 suh that R(q
t
; e) > 1 for all t  t
0
by
stability of q. In fat, sine q 7! R(q; e) is stritly inreasing (f. Lemma 8) and fq
t
g
t0
onverges monotonially, we have R(q
t
; e)  R
t
0
:= R(q
t
0
; e) > 1 for all t  t
0
. Thus,
lim
t!1
b
t
 b
t
0
lim
t!1
R
t t
0
t
0
=1 and p
t
= q
t
+ b
t
> b
t
for all t gives lim
t!1
p
t
=1.
(iii) If b
0
= 0, then b
t
= 0 and q
t
= p
t
for all t and the laim follows from (i). If b
0
> 0
and R(q; e) < 1, the same arguments as in (ii) yield R(q
t
; e)  R
t
0
:= R(q
t
0
; e) < 1 for
t  t
0
. Thus, 0  lim
t!1
b
t
 b
t
0
lim
t!1
R
t t
0
t
0
= 0 and lim
t!1
p
t
= lim
t!1
q
t
= q. 
A.7 Proof of Lemma 6
(i) The proof of Lemma 2 revealed that F
q
1
(q
1
; q; e) < 0 with F dened in (10). Sine
F
e
y
(q
1
; q; e) = q u
00
(e
y
  q) < 0, q > 0, the laim follows from the Impliit Funtion
Theorem.
(ii) Reall that xed points are solutions to G(q; e) = F (q; q; e) = 0. By (i), G
e
y
(q; e) =
F
e
y
(q; q; e) < 0. As lim
q! e
o
G(q; e) = lim
q!e
y
G(q; e) = 1 implies G
q
(q; e) < 0 <
G
q
(

q; e), the laim follows again from the Impliit Funtion Theorem. 
A.8 Proof of Lemma 7
(i) We rst show that

Q is self-supporting. Let q 2

Q be arbitrary. Then, using Lemma
4(ii) and the monotoniity properties of f together with the denitions (19a{) we have
for eah e
y
2 E :
q
min
= f(q
min
; e
y
max
)  f(q
min
; e
y
)  f(q; e
y
)  f(q
max
; e
y
)  f(q
max
; e
y
min
)) = q
max
:
(A.11)
Thus, f(q; e
y
) 2

Q . To prove that Q is self-supporting, let q 2 Q and e
y
2 E
y
be
arbitrary. The ase q 2

Q is evident, so suppose rst that q 2 (q
max
;

q
min
). Then,
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by (19a{), q(e
y
)  q
max
< q <

q
min


q(e
y
) whih implies, by Lemma 4(ii) and
monotoniity of f that q(e
y
) < f(q; e
y
) < q. Thus, f(q; e
y
) 2 Q . Conversely, suppose
q 2 (0; q
min
). Then, by (19a{) 0 < q < q
min
 q(e
y
) whih implies q < f(q; e
y
) < q(e
y
)
by Lemma 4(ii) and monotoniity of f . Thus, f(q; e
y
) 2 Q again.
(ii) Let q
0
2 Q be arbitrary. Dene the sequenes fq
t
g
t0
and fq
t
g
t0
by setting q
0
=
q
0
= q
0
and q
t+1
:= f(q
t
; e
y
min
) and q
t+1
:= f(q
t
; e
y
max
) for eah t  0. Then, by the
monotoniity properties of f , q
t
 q
t
 q
t
P{a.s. for all t  0 and the laim follows from
lim
t!1
q
t
= q(e
y
max
) = q
min
and lim
t!1
q
t
= q(e
y
min
) = q
max
. 
A.9 Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 7 ensures that q
t
2 Q  (0; e
y
min
) P{a.s. for all t  0. By (1) and (13), b
0
 0
implies b
t
 0 by, (8), p
t
 q
t
> 0 P{a.s. for all t  0. 
A.10 Proof of Lemma 8
The laim follows diretly by taking the partial derivatives of (13) and using Lemmata
2 and 6(i). 
A.11 Proof of Theorem 3
(i) Suppose R
min
> 1. Then, R(q; e)  R
min
> 1 for all q 2

Q and e 2 E
y
. Let
^
R
min
be a number between 1 and R
min
. By ontinuity of R, we an hoose an open
neighborhood
^
Q  Q of

Q suh that R(q; e) >
^
R
min
for all q 2
^
Q and e 2 E
y
. Let
q
0
2 Q be arbitrary. By Lemma 7(ii), there exists t
0
> 0 suh that q
t
2
^
Q for all
t > t
0
P{a.s. Hene, R
t
>
^
R
min
> 1 for all t > t
0
P{a.s. and it follows from (1) that
lim
t!1
b
t
 lim
t!1
b
t
0
 
^
R
min

t t
0
= 1. Sine q
t
remains uniformly bounded, the limit
of the proess fp
t
g
t0
follows from (8).
(ii) Similar to the previous part, hoose a number
^
R
max
between R
max
and 1 and an
open neighborhood
^
Q  Q of

Q suh that R(q; e) <
^
R
max
< 1 for all q 2
^
Q and
e 2 E
y
. Let q
0
2 Q be arbitrary. By Lemma 7(ii), there exists t
0
> 0 suh that q
t
2
^
Q
for all t > t
0
P{a.s. Hene, R
t
<
^
R
max
< 1 for all t > t
0
P{a.s. and it follows that
0  lim
t!1
b
t
 lim
t!1
b
t
0
 
^
R
max

t t
0
= 0. Finally, the previous result and (8) imply
diretly that lim
t!1
jp
t
  q
t
j = lim
t!1
jb
t
j = 0. 
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